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A Few Words of Caution as the 
Supreme Court Considers Fry v. 
Napoleon Community Schools 
Kevin Golembiewski* 
Abstract 
This term, the Supreme Court will consider Fry v. Napoleon 
Community Schools. Fry implicates a circuit split on the proper 
scope of the exhaustion requirement in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). That section 
requires parents of students with disabilities to exhaust state 
administrative remedies “before the filing of a civil 
action . . . seeking relief that is also available under” the IDEA. 
Two different approaches to this requirement have emerged among 
the courts of appeals: an “injury-centered” approach and a 
“relief-centered” approach. Under the injury-centered approach, 
exhaustion is required when a child’s injuries are 
education-related. In contrast, the relief-centered approach 
demands exhaustion only if a parent seeks a form of relief that can 
be obtained under the IDEA. If the Supreme Court adopts the 
injury-centered approach in Fry, it should be cautious in its 
application of the approach. The Court’s application of the 
injury-centered approach could have important, unforeseen 
consequences for students with disabilities. The approach requires 
courts to consider what “educational” means under the IDEA—an 
analysis that bears on the scope of the IDEA’s substantive 
protections. And the Court has yet to provide guidance as to the 
definition of “educational.” Therefore, the Court’s application of 
the approach in Fry could have a significant impact on students’ 
access to special education services. 
                                                                                                     
 *  Law clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; Harvard Law 
School, J.D., 2013, cum laude; College of the Holy Cross, B.A., 2010, summa cum 
laude. 
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I. Introduction 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is the 
flagship civil rights legislation for students with disabilities. 
Under the IDEA, school districts must ensure that students with 
disabilities receive a “free and appropriate public education” 
(FAPE).1 When a parent believes her child is being denied a 
FAPE, she can sue her child’s school district for injunctive relief, 
as well as certain types of compensatory relief.2 However, § 
1415(l) of the IDEA requires parents to exhaust state 
administrative remedies prior to pursuing “a civil 
action . . . seeking relief that is . . . available under” the IDEA.3 
Federal courts of appeals disagree on the proper scope of this 
provision. This term, in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools,4 the 
Supreme Court will address that split. 
Two different approaches to the IDEA’s exhaustion 
requirement have emerged among the courts of appeals: an 
“injury-centered” approach and a “relief-centered” approach.5 
                                                                                                     
 1.  20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(3) (2016). The Supreme Court is currently 
considering the proper standard for a FAPE. See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. 
Dist., 798 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, No. 15-827 (U.S.S.C. 
September 29, 2016). Some courts have found that a FAPE requires school 
districts to provide students an opportunity to make meaningful educational 
progress, while other courts have concluded that a FAPE requires only an 
opportunity to obtain some educational benefit. See id. at 1338–39 
(summarizing different circuit courts’ approach to the FAPE standard). 
 2. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). 
 3. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). 
 4. 788 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2540 (2016). 
 5.  See Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 873–74 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(en banc) (discussing the injury-centered/relief-centered circuit split); Petition 
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Under the injury-centered approach, exhaustion is required when 
a student’s injuries are educational in nature. In other words, 
when an alleged injury relates to a student’s right to a FAPE, 
exhaustion is required.6 Unlike the injury-centered approach, the 
relief-centered approach demands exhaustion only if a parent 
seeks some form of relief that can be obtained under the IDEA.7 
Most courts of appeals, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit in Fry, have adopted the injury-centered 
approach. But the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits have embraced the relief-centered approach. 
If the Supreme Court adopts the injury-centered approach in 
Fry, it should be cautious in its application of the approach. In 
determining whether a parent’s claims are educational in nature, 
courts must consider, as a threshold matter, what “educational” 
means under the IDEA. That analysis has consequences for IDEA 
issues well beyond exhaustion. How courts interpret 
“educational” is crucial to FAPE claims—IDEA eligibility and the 
scope of the IDEA’s protections turn on a student’s educational 
progress and needs. Yet, the exact definition of “educational” is 
unsettled among courts. Indeed, the Supreme Court has yet to 
provide guidance to lower courts as to that definition. The Court’s 
application of the injury-centered approach in Fry could therefore 
heavily shape courts’ interpretation of “educational” and 
significantly impact students’ access to special education services 
moving forward.  
II. The Exhaustion Requirement 
Section 1415(l) was passed as part of the Handicapped 
Children’s Protection Act of 1986—an amendment to the IDEA. 
The section states: 
                                                                                                     
for Writ of Certiorari at 9–12, Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., No. 15-497 (U.S.S.C. 
June 28, 2016) (same). 
 6. Fry, 788 F.3d at 627 (citing F.H. ex rel. Hall v. Memphis City Sch., 764 
F.3d 638, 644 (6th Cir. 2014)). 
 7. See Payne, 653 F.3d at 871 (“Non-IDEA claims that do not seek relief 
available under the IDEA are not subject to the exhaustion requirement, even if 
they allege injuries that could conceivable have been redressed by the IDEA.”). 
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Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit 
the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the 
Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
[(ADA)][,] . . . the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [(Section 
504)] . . . or other Federal laws protecting the rights of 
children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil 
action under such laws seeking relief that is also available 
under [the IDEA], the [state administrative] procedures [set 
forth in the IDEA] shall be exhausted to the same extent as 
would be required had the action been brought under [the 
IDEA].8 
Congress passed this section in response to Smith v. Robinson.9 
In Smith, the Supreme Court held that the IDEA is the “exclusive 
avenue” through which a parent can pursue anti-discrimination 
relief on behalf of a student with a disability.10 Section 1415(l) 
overturned Smith’s holding and opened the door to parents 
pursuing other types of federal anti-discrimination claims, 
subject to certain exhaustion constraints.11   
Since its enactment in 1986, § 1415(l)’s exhaustion 
requirement has been the subject of frequent litigation.12 Parents 
generally favor a less stringent exhaustion requirement, allowing 
them greater flexibility in their efforts to vindicate their 
children’s rights. In contrast, school districts are inclined towards 
a robust exhaustion requirement. At the outset of a student 
discrimination lawsuit, school districts have an information 
advantage because student discrimination claims arise in the 
                                                                                                     
 8. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2016). 
 9. 468 U.S. 992 (1984). See S. REP. NO. 99-112, at 2 (1985) (stating that 
Congress intended § 1415(l) to abrogate Smith’s holding that the IDEA 
preempts other laws protecting students with disabilities); H.R. REP. NO. 99-
296, at 4, 15 (1985) (same). 
 10. See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012–13 (“We conclude, therefore, that where 
the EHA is available to a handicapped child asserting a right to a free 
appropriate public education, based either on the EHA or on the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the EHA is the exclusive 
avenue through which the child and his parents or guardian can pursue their 
claim.”).  
 11. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). 
 12. See Peter J. Maher, Caution on Exhaustion: The Courts’ 
Misinterpretation of the IDEA’s Exhaustion Requirement for Claims Brought by 
Students Covered by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA but Not 
by the IDEA, 44 CONN. L. REV. 259, 281–92 (2011) (summarizing a number of 
federal cases where exhaustion was at issue). 
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school setting. State administrative proceedings allow school 
districts to maintain that advantage, as those proceedings have 
limited discovery requirements. Federal courts impose robust 
discovery requirements that are more effective in mitigating 
information asymmetry. 
Often, exhaustion issues arise when a parent brings an ADA 
and/or a Section 504 civil action against her child’s school 
district.13 The purpose of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement is to 
provide states an opportunity to quickly address a denial of a 
FAPE since states are “best equipped to craft [an appropriate 
educational program] or remedial substitutes.”14 And the exact 
same school district failures that give rise to a FAPE violation 
under the IDEA can trigger an ADA and/or a Section 504 claim. 
In fact, the IDEA, ADA, and Section 504 each compel school 
districts to afford students with disabilities a FAPE,15 resulting 
in some ADA and Section 504 claims being fully subsumed by the 
IDEA.16 As a result, ADA and Section 504 claims can implicate 
the types of educational-programming issues that the IDEA’s 
exhaustion requirement seeks to funnel through state 
administrative proceedings. 
In considering the reach of the exhaustion requirement, the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Sixth, 
                                                                                                     
 13.  Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2011). 
 14. See Long v. Dawson Springs Indep. Sch. Dist., 197 F. App’x 427, 433–34 
(6th Cir. 2006) (citing Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 297 (1982)). 
 15. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) (2016) (“A recipient that operates a public 
elementary or secondary education program or activity shall provide a free 
appropriate public education to each qualified handicapped person who is in the 
recipient's jurisdiction, regardless of the nature or severity of the person’s 
handicap.”); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.103(a) (2016). But see Mark Weber, A New 
Look at Section 504 and the ADA in Special Education Cases, 16 TEX. J. ON C.L. 
& C.R. 1, 11–14 (2010) (exploring Section 504’s FAPE standard and concluding 
that it may diverge from the IDEA’s FAPE standard). 
 16. Notably, however, the ADA and Section 504 also provide students with 
disabilities a type of protection that is distinct from the IDEA. Both require 
school districts to ensure that students with disabilities receive equal access to 
school facilities and services. This is the same type of general anti-
discrimination protection that the ADA and Section 504 afford other groups of 
persons with disabilities. Such “equal access” protections differ from the IDEA’s 
guarantee of a FAPE, which only ensures students with disabilities the 
opportunity to receive educational benefit. See Gabel ex rel. L.G. v. Bd. of Educ. 
of Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 368 F. Supp. 2d 313, 333–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the injury-
centered approach.17 In Charlie F. v. Board of Education of 
Skokie School District,18 the Seventh Circuit set forth the 
framework for the injury-centered approach. Each of the other 
courts of appeals adopting the approach has relied in part on 
Charlie F.  
The Charlie F. court’s analysis of § 1415(l) focused on the 
phrase, “relief that is also available [under the IDEA].”19 Based 
on this language, the court concluded that whenever the “nature 
of [a parent’s] claim” is such that the injury alleged could in 
theory be remedied by the IDEA, relief is “available” under the 
IDEA and the parent must therefore exhaust the claim.20 
According to the court, this occurs whenever the “genesis and 
manifestations of the [alleged] problem are educational.”21 Thus, 
the injury-related approach turns on whether a parent’s claim is 
educational in nature. 
Departing from the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits 
have embraced the relief-centered approach.22 In Payne v. 
Peninsula School District, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, 
“reject[ed] the injury-centered approach . . . and h[e]ld that a 
relief-centered approach more aptly reflects the meaning of the 
                                                                                                     
 17. For cases in which these courts have adopted the injury-centered 
approach, see Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 61–63 (1st Cir. 
2002); Cave v. East Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F.3d 240, 246–47 (2d 
Cir. 2008); Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 276–78 (3d 
Cir. 2014); Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist., 98 F.3d 989, 991–92 
(7th Cir. 1996); Cudjoe v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, 297 F.3d 1058, 1063–68 (10th 
Cir. 2002); Babicz v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., 135 F.3d 1420, 1422 & n.10 (11th 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 816 (1998). 
 18. 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 19. Id. at 991–92. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. See Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (“Non-IDEA claims that do not seek relief available under the IDEA are 
not subject to the exhaustion requirement, even if they allege injuries that could 
conceivable have been redressed by the IDEA.”); Moore v. Kansas City Pub. 
Sch., 828 F.3d 687, 693 (8th Cir. 2016) (adopting the Ninth Circuit’s approach to 
exhaustion). 
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IDEA’s exhaustion requirement.”23 Thereafter, the Eighth Circuit 
agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s Payne decision.24 
The Payne court held that “[t]he IDEA’s exhaustion 
requirement applies to claims only to the extent that the relief 
actually sought by the plaintiff could have been provided by the 
IDEA.”25 Explaining its rationale, the court stated: 
[Section 1415(l)] specifies that exhaustion is required “before 
the filing of a civil action . . . seeking relief that is also 
available under [the IDEA].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). This suggests 
that whether a plaintiff could have sought relief available 
under the IDEA is irrelevant—what matters is whether the 
plaintiff actually sought relief available under the IDEA. In 
other words, when determining whether the IDEA requires a 
plaintiff to exhaust, courts should start by looking at a 
complaint’s prayer for relief and determine whether the relief 
sought is also available under the IDEA. If it is not, then it is 
likely that § 1415(l) does not require exhaustion in that case.26 
The relief-centered and injury-centered approaches most 
often diverge when a parent brings ADA or Section 504 claims 
seeking money damages. While the ADA and Section 504 provide 
for money damages, the IDEA does not.27 Therefore, under the 
relief-centered approach, exhaustion is never required when a 
parent seeks solely money damages. The injury-centered 
approach, however, requires a parent requesting money damages 
to exhaust state administrative remedies if her claim is 
educational in nature. 
In Fry—a case involving claims for money damages—the 
Supreme Court will address this injury-centered/relief-centered 
circuit split.  
                                                                                                     
 23.  Payne, 653 F.3d at 874.  
 24. Moore, 828 F.3d at 693.  
 25. Payne, 653 F.3d at 874. 
 26. Id. at 875. 
 27. See Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 124–25 (1st Cir. 
2003) (“We conclude that tort-like money damages, as opposed to compensatory 
equitable relief, are not available under [the] IDEA.”); id. (noting that the 
Supreme Court in Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 
(1985) indicated that money damages are not available for IDEA violations). 
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III. Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools 
In 2012, Stacy and Brent Fry filed a complaint in the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on behalf of their 
daughter, E.F., against E.F.’s school district, Napoleon 
Community Schools (Napoleon). In their complaint, the Frys 
allege that Napoleon violated the ADA and Section 504 by 
refusing to permit E.F. to attend school with her service dog. E.F. 
was born with cerebral palsy and, as a result, has limited motor 
skills and mobility.28 She is an IDEA-eligible, special education 
student. E.F.’s service dog, Wonder, assists her with mobility and 
daily activities, such as retrieving dropped items, opening and 
closing doors, and taking her coat off.29 The Frys allege that 
Napoleon’s refusal to accommodate E.F. by allowing Wonder to 
attend school with her denied her, inter alia, equal access to 
school facilities, the use of Wonder as a service dog, the ability to 
form a bond with Wonder, and the opportunity to interact with 
other students at school.30 The Frys also assert that Napoleon’s 
actions caused E.F. psychological harm.31 As relief, the Frys seek 
only money damages and attorney’s fees.32 They did not pursue 
state administrative remedies prior to filing their complaint in 
district court. 
Napoleon filed a motion with the district court for judgment 
on the pleadings, raising the affirmative defense of exhaustion. In 
considering the motion, the district court relied on a Second 
Circuit decision—Cave v. East Meadow Union Free School 
District33—and concluded that “the theory behind [a parent’s] 
grievance may activate the IDEA’s process, even if the [parent] 
wants a form of relief that the IDEA does not supply.”34 Hence, 
                                                                                                     
 28. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 788 F.3d 622, 623–24 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, 136 S. Ct. 2540 (2016). 
 29. Id. at 624. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. The Frys also included a catchall request for “other relief [that the 
court] deems appropriate.” See Napoleon Community Schools Response to 
Petition for Certiorari at App. 21, Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., No. 15-497 
(U.S.S.C. June 28, 2016). 
 33. 514 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 34. EF ex rel. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., No. 12-15507, 2014 WL 106624, 
at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 788 
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the district court applied the injury centered-approach. The Frys 
argued to the district court that, even under that approach, they 
were not required to exhaust state administrative procedures 
prior to filing their complaint because they believe that E.F. 
received a FAPE. That is to say, the Frys asserted that they are 
not challenging the adequacy of E.F.’s educational program; they 
are only claiming that Napoleon denied E.F. equal access to its 
facilities and services by refusing to allow Wonder to attend 
school with her. The district court found this position unavailing, 
determining that the Frys’ claims “at least partially . . . implicate 
issues relating to EF’s” education.35 For example, Napoleon would 
have to amend E.F.’s Individualized Education Program (IEP) to 
accommodate Wonder’s presence during certain parts of the 
school day.36 The district court therefore held that the Frys were 
required to exhaust their claims.37  
A divided Sixth Circuit panel affirmed the decision of the 
district court. Like the district court, the panel applied the injury-
centered approach, holding that exhaustion is required “when 
both the genesis and the manifestations of [an alleged] problem 
[are] educational.”38 As such, the panel focused its analysis on 
whether the Frys’ complaint implicates educational issues—a 
task that required the court to consider the meaning of 
“educational” under the IDEA.  
Applying the injury-centered approach to the Frys’ claims, 
the panel determined that “[t]he primary harms of not permitting 
Wonder to attend school with E.F.—inhibiting the development of 
E.F.’s bond with the dog and, perhaps, hurting her confidence and 
social experience at school—fall” under the IDEA’s definition of 
“educational.”39 According to the panel, “[d]eveloping a bond with 
Wonder that allows E.F. to function more independently outside 
the classroom is an educational goal” because “[e]ducational” 
needs encompass a student’s “academic, developmental, and 
                                                                                                     
F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2540 (2016). 
 35. Id. at *5. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch. 788 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, 136 S. Ct. 2540 (2016). 
 39. Id. at 628. 
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functional needs.”40  The panel explained that, under the IDEA, 
“IEP[s] should include” service dog assistance and other 
interventions that “a student actually needs to learn in order to 
function effectively.”41 In addition, the panel found that, “[t]o the 
extent that the Frys . . . allege that Wonder would have provided 
specific psychological and social assistance to E.F. at school, the 
value of this assistance is also crucially linked to E.F.’s 
education”; “[a]ccommodations that help make a student feel 
more comfortable and confident at school should be included in an 
IEP.”42 Based on these findings, the panel concluded that “the 
specific injuries the Frys allege are essentially educational” and 
“the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement applies to the Frys’ 
claims.”43 
Judge Daughtrey dissented from the panel decision in Fry. 
She did not challenge the Fry majority’s use of the injury-
centered approach. Instead, she claimed that the injuries alleged 
by the Frys are unrelated to the IDEA’s substantive protections 
because they are “noneducational in nature.”44 In addressing the 
nature of the Frys’ claims, Judge Daughtrey construed 
“educational” more narrowly than the majority.45 According to 
Judge Daughtrey, the Frys’ goal in having Wonder attend school 
with E.F. was to “develop more independent motor skills, which is 
not the function of an academic program”—“basic mobility is not 
a subject taught in elementary school.”46 Rather than improve 
E.F.’s educational programming, the Frys sought to have E.F. 
and Wonder “become closely attached to one another in order to 
make the dog a valuable [mobility] resource for the child, 
especially during non-school hours.”47 Moreover, Wonder’s 
                                                                                                     
 40. Id. at 628 (emphasis added). 
 41. Id. at 628. 
 42. Id. at 629. 
 43. Id. at 623. 
 44. Id. at 631 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). 
 45. In fact, Judge Daughtrey specifically criticized the majority’s broad 
interpretation of “educational,” stating that, § 1415(l)’s carve-out for Section 504 
and ADA claims “would have no meaning if any and every aspect of a child’s 
development could be said to be ‘educational’ and, therefore, related to a FAPE.” 
Id. at 635. 
 46. Id. at 632. 
 47. Id. 
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in-school role was purely related to E.F.’s ability to physically 
access the school facility—much like a wheelchair.48 Hence, like 
the majority, Judge Daughtrey viewed Wonder as assisting E.F. 
with becoming more independent; however, Judge Daughtrey 
concluded that such assistance was not educational because it 
was mobility-related, not academic-related.49  
IV. The Injury-Centered Approach: Proceed with Caution 
When the Supreme Court hears Fry this term, it should be 
cautious in considering the injury-centered approach. As 
illustrated by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Fry, the approach 
requires courts to opine on the IDEA’s definition of “educational.” 
If the Court conducts that analysis in Fry, its decision could have 
significant consequences for IDEA issues well beyond exhaustion. 
How courts interpret “educational” determines the scope of the 
IDEA’s protections. Yet, the exact definition of “educational” is 
unsettled among circuit courts, and the Supreme Court has 
provided limited guidance on the issue. Therefore, a decision by 
the Court that delves into the definition of “educational” could 
heavily influence lower courts’ approach to FAPE claims and 
students’ access to special education services. 
“Courts’ interpretation of the term ‘educational’ is critical to 
students with . . . disabilities accessing IDEA services.”50 How 
broadly courts interpret “educational” dictates IDEA eligibility 
and the scope of school districts’ obligations to IDEA-eligible 
students.51 Students are eligible for IDEA services if they have a 
disability that “adversely affects [their] educational 
performance.”52 Additionally, the IDEA’s substantive protections 
                                                                                                     
 48.  Id. at 633–34. 
 49.  Id. at 634 (“[T]he Frys’ complaint does not tie use of the service dog to 
[E.F.]’s academic program or seek to modify her IEP in any way.”); id. (stating 
that, in contrast to a human aide Napoleon provided to E.F., Wonder’s role was 
to “help [E.F.] develop and maintain balance and mobility, [not] to ensure her 
ability to progress in her academic program”). 
 50.  Kevin Golembiewski, Disparate Treatment and Lost Opportunity: 
Courts’ Approach to Students with Mental Health Disabilities Under the IDEA, 
88 TEMP. L. REV. 473, 484 (2016). 
 51.  Id. at 485–86. 
 52.  34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i) (2016) (emphasis added). 
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only guarantee eligible students the opportunity to receive 
meaningful educational benefit.53 As a result, when a student 
with a disability is “struggling in areas deemed noneducational 
but is making educational progress, her school district has no 
obligation to provide her special education supports and 
services.”54 And “in cases where [such a] student is already 
eligible for special education, the school district has no obligation 
to provide any additional supports and services.55  
Despite this central role of “educational” in the IDEA, there 
is significant debate among federal courts as to the meaning of 
that term. Many courts construe “educational” as solely 
encompassing developmental domains that are academic in 
nature—that is, those courts equate “educational” with 
“academic.”56 At the same time, other courts view “educational” 
more expansively, finding that academics and other 
developmental areas, such as behavior, socio-emotional 
intelligence, and independent living skills, are educational 
areas.57  
                                                                                                     
 53.  Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182 (3d 
Cir. 1988). 
 54.  Golembiewski, supra note 50, at 485. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  See, e.g., Mr. N.C. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 300 F. App’x 11, 13 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (equating “educational performance” with a student’s academic 
performance); R.B. ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 
946 (9th Cir. 2007) (same); J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 67 
(2d Cir. 2000) (same); G.H. v. Great Valley Sch. Dist., No. 12-2735, 2013 WL 
2156011, at *7 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2013) (same); J.S. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 826 F. Supp. 2d 635, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (same); C.T. v. Croton-Harmon 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 812 F. Supp. 2d 420, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (same); 
Katherine S. v. Umbach, No. CIV.A. oo-T-982-E, 2002 WL 226697, at *11 (M.D. 
Ala. Feb. 1, 2002) (same). 
 57.  See, e.g., Mr. I. ex rel. L.I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1, 
12 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[E]ducational performance . . . is more than just 
academics.”); City of San Diego v. Cal. Special Educ. Hearing Office, 93 F.3d 
1458, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[E]ducational benefit [under the IDEA] is not 
limited to academic needs, but includes the social and emotional needs that 
affect academic progress, school behavior, and socialization.”); Lauren P. ex rel. 
David & Annmarie P. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 310 F. App’x 552, 554–55 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (concluding that the school district’s “failure to address [the student’s] 
behavioral problems in a systematic and consistent way denied [her] a FAPE”); 
M.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 394 (3d Cir. 1996) (determining that 
the IDEA requires school district to address students’ behavioral and 
communication needs). 
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The majority and dissenting opinions in the Sixth Circuit’s 
Fry decision illustrate this disagreement amongst courts. Based 
on the IDEA’s broad remedial goal of ensuring that students with 
disabilities become self-sufficient adults, the Fry majority 
concluded that in-school services that are nonacademic but 
helpful for developing independent-living skills are educational 
services.58 The court thus interpreted “educational” to extend 
beyond academics. In contrast, the dissent tied “educational” to 
academic programming, apparently because academics are the 
primary focus of schools.59  
Given the important role of “educational” in IDEA claims and 
the current malleability of that term, precedents that explore the 
meaning of “educational” can heavily influence the scope of the 
IDEA’s protections. Courts create this type of precedent when 
they apply the injury-centered approach. Fry is again instructive.  
The Sixth Circuit found that bonding with a service dog and 
achieving socio-emotional stability at school are educational 
endeavors.60 This determination supports an expansive reading of 
“educational” that encompasses independent living skills, as well 
as socio-emotional development. Under that interpretation, a 
student who has a disability that prevents him from maintaining 
emotional stability would be eligible for IDEA services because 
his disability affects an educational area—his socio-emotional 
development. The student’s school district would therefore have 
to provide him services designed to address his socio-emotional 
needs, such as in-school counseling or a behavior plan.61 
Conversely, such a student would not be IDEA-eligible under 
Judge Daughtrey’s “academic” interpretation of “educational,” 
and the student’s school district would have no obligation to 
provide him socio-emotional supports. 
At this time, no court has relied on Fry’s “educational” 
analysis in considering the merits of a FAPE claim. However, it 
may just be a matter of time. Courts considering FAPE claims 
                                                                                                     
 58.  Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 788 F.3d 622, 628 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, 136 S. Ct. 2540 (2016).  
 59.  Id. at 633 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). 
 60.  Id. at 624. 
 61.  See Golembiewski, supra note 50, at 483. 
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have repeatedly looked to decisions applying the injury-centered 
approach for guidance.62 
If the Supreme Court adopts and applies the injury-centered 
approach in Fry, its interpretation of “educational” could have a 
significant impact on FAPE claims moving forward. Beyond the 
broad influence the Court wields as a result of its institutional 
role, the Court has yet to opine on the meaning of “educational,” 
and the specific questions raised in Fry about that term are the 
subject of intense debate among parents and school districts. The 
Court has heard several IDEA cases in the past few decades, but 
those cases have not required it to explore what “educational” 
means under the IDEA. As such, that type of analysis in Fry 
could be particularly impactful among lower courts. Furthermore, 
the extent to which independent living and socio-emotional 
skills—as non-academic skills—constitute educational skills are 
contentious issues among parents and school districts,63 and as 
noted above, Fry implicates questions about both types of skills. 
In light of these circumstances, the Supreme Court should 
carefully consider the implications of its decision if it chooses to 
apply the injury-centered approach in Fry.64 
Of course, even if the Supreme Court adopts the injury-
centered approach in Fry, it does not have to apply the approach. 
                                                                                                     
 62.  See, e.g., M.L. v. Federal Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 634, 650 (9th Cir. 
2005) (citing Charlie F.—the Seventh Circuit exhaustion case establishing the 
injury-centered approach—when considering the merits of an IDEA claim); S.S. 
by & through St. v. D.C., 68 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 & n.4 (D.D.C. 2014) (same); D.F. 
ex rel. L.M.P. v. Leon Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 4:13CV3-RH/CAS, 2014 WL 28798, at *4 
(N.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 2014) (relying on an injury-centered, exhaustion case—M.T.V. 
v. DeKalb Cty. Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 2006)—in determining that 
retaliation can provide a basis for a FAPE claim). 
 63.  See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (discussing the split 
among courts attempting to define “educational”). 
 64.  Importantly, in performing this analysis, the Court should be cognizant 
of the unique incentives faced by the parties. A broader interpretation of 
“educational” is beneficial to parents and students. Again, school districts are 
only required to provide supports and services necessary to educational 
progress. Thus, if “educational” is narrowly construed to exclude socio-emotional 
skills, then school districts need not assist students with socio-emotional 
development. However, when confronted with the injury-centered approach in 
the exhaustion context, parents, including the Frys, are incentivized to argue for 
a narrow reading of “educational.” Judge Daughtrey’s dissent underscores this 
point; her position on “educational” is favorable to the Frys but might harm 
parents outside the exhaustion context. 
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Remanding to the Sixth Circuit without applying the approach 
might be the most prudent course of action considering the 
current posture of the case. Although courts generally address 
affirmative defenses such as exhaustion at the summary 
judgment stage,65 the district court dismissed the Frys’ claims on 
the pleadings. Consequently, in determining whether E.F.’s 
injuries are educational in nature, the Sixth Circuit lacked the 
benefit of a developed record. The Sixth Circuit was forced to rely 
solely on the allegations in the Frys’ complaint, and under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Frys were only required to 
allege plausible claims; their complaint did not need to provide 
detailed factual allegations about E.F.’s injuries. Indeed, the Frys 
may need discovery to determine the actual scope of E.F.’s 
injuries. The Frys do not attend school with E.F. and are 
therefore limited in their ability to access information about 
E.F.’s in-school experiences.  
Without the benefit of a developed record, the Sixth Circuit 
was forced to resort to assumptions and inferences about E.F.’s 
alleged injuries when it considered whether those injuries are 
educational in nature. In describing the Frys’ allegations and 
E.F.’s injuries, the Sixth Circuit stated: 
The Frys allege in effect that E.F.’s . . . school denied her a free 
appropriate public education. In particular, they 
allege . . . implicitly that Wonder’s absence hurt her sense of 
independence and social confidence at school. . . . One might 
also infer, though the Frys do not allege it directly, that 
[Napoleon’s actions] inhibit[ed] E.F.’s sense of confidence and 
independence, as well as her ability to overcome social 
barriers, in school.66 
Thus, as the dissent recognized, the majority’s conclusions about 
E.F.’s injuries “w[ere] based on . . . speculation, because the Frys’ 
complaint was dismissed on the pleadings before any discovery 
could occur.”67 Rather than attempting to infer the exact injuries 
                                                                                                     
 65.  See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214–15 (2007) (explaining and 
discussing the exhaustion requirement); see also Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 
653 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[T]he IDEA’s exhaustion 
requirement is a claims processing provision that IDEA defendants may offer as 
an affirmative defense.”). 
 66.  Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch. 788 F.3d 622, 627–28 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, 136 S. Ct. 2540 (2016) (emphases added).  
 67.  Id. at 633 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). 
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at issue and then delving into the “educational” debate, the 
Supreme Court may consider remanding with instructions to 
allow the parties to conduct discovery.  
V. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Fry will clarify the proper 
scope of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement, thus resolving an 
important circuit split. Should the Court resolve that split by 
adopting the injury-centered approach, its decision may also bear 
on a deep split among courts about the meaning of “educational.” 
But despite the importance of this issue, it is not squarely before 
the Court; it lurks in the shadows of Fry. The Court should 
proceed cautiously.  
 
